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T COMMON LAW, when contracts or conveyances had been
reduced to writing, the written instruments were conclusive
as to the terms of such contracts or conveyances, especially in the
case of instruments under seals. Social interest in the security
of transactions required that great importance be attached to these
instruments. However, to hold such an instrument absolutely in-
vulnerable was often unjust, if it did not express the actual intent
of the parties. Therefore, equity offers relief from such injustice
by rectifying, or reforming, the written instrument to make it con-
form to the actual intent. Having taken jurisdiction to reform,
equity will give whatever further relief is necessary to settle the
whole case.'
Rather than define reformation, Texas decisions distinguish it
from other remedies.2 So does Professor Pomeroy, who, however,
states the following rule:
Reformation is appropriate, when an agreement has been made, or
a transaction has been entered into or determined upon, as intended
by all the parties interested, but in reducing such agreement or trans-
action to writing, either through the mistake common to both parties,
or through the mistake of the plaintiff accompanied by the fraudulent
knowledge and procurement of the defendant, the written instrument
fails to express the real agreement or transaction.3
A common instance of mutual mistake is that of a conveyance
which, because of a mistake of the scrivener not discovered by
grantor or grantee, describes too much or too little property.
In the leading case of Cole v. Fickett' the right to reformation,
and the corresponding duty to submit to reformation, passed to
subsequent grantees when the mistake was innocently repeated in
subsequent deeds. Relief is also given for mutual mistake when
the parties to a deed have used quitclaim language, intending
1 CLARK, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY (1919) §331.
2 36 TEx. JUR., Reformation of Instruments, § 2, p. 713.
POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (5th ed. 1941) § 870, p. 384.
495 Me. 265, 49 At. 1066 (1901).
[Vol. 7
NOTES AND COMMENTS
thereby to convey a definite interest in a larger tract in the mis-
taken belief that such interest is all the grantor owns, whereas
the fact is that the grantor owns a larger interest and the grantee
learns this but remains silent prior to delivery of the deed.5
Reformation for mutual mistake has been given of a written
contract intended to cover the entire production of the plaintiff,
in which the parties mistakenly used a term covering the exact
amount of anticipated production instead of the term "entire pro-
duction," the plaintiff's later crop failure having made it impos-
sible for him to deliver the specified amount.6 Also, where a note
for $10,000 was given by one partner to another, in their mistaken
belief that this was the correct amount to cover a previous loan
of $10,000 from partnership funds, the note was reformed to
cover only the correct amount of $5,000.'
While reformation may be secured for mutual mistake, as illus-
trated by the foregoing examples, it is not usually possible to
obtain reformation for unilateral mistake. Most courts hold that
the unilateral mistake of one party, in the absence of fraud or
imposition on the part of the other party, is insufficient ground
for reformation.8 Some courts have held, however, that reforma-
tion may be had for unilateral mistake alone if an unconscionable
advantage has been gained and there was no gross negligence on
the part of the petitioner, either in falling into the error or in not
sooner claiming redress, and no intervening equities have ac-
crued.9 A suggestion of this possibility is to be found in one Texas
case where, however, the court indicates rescission, not reforma-
tion, would be the likely remedy.' This is criticized by at least
5 Cleghorn v. Zumwalt, 83 Cal. 155, 23 Pac. 294 (1890).
"Snipes Mountain Co. v. Benz Brothers & Co., 162 Wash. 334, 298 Pac. 714, 74
A. L. R. 1287 (1931).
7 Gould v. Emerson, 160 Mass. 438, 35 N. E. 1065 (1894).
8 By-Fi Building & Loan Association v. New York Casualty Co., 116 N. J. Eq. 265,
173 At. 90 (1934) ; New York Life Insurance Co. v. Kimball, 93 Vt. 147, 106 Atl.
676 (1919).
9 Brown v. Lamphear, 35 Vt. 252 (1862).




one writer, who wonders how far the court would carry the doc-
trine in granting reformation.1 The overwhelming majority of
jurisdictions give reformation for unilateral mistake when the de-
fendant is guilty of fraud whereby the terms of the instrument
are suppressed or misrepresented so that the instrument executed
does not accurately state the agreement actually made. 2
The petitioner is denied reformation when he and the defend-
ant originally intended the contract as written, although the peti-
tioner would not have executed the written contract if he had not
made a mistake as to some collateral or extrinsic fact.' The same
result is reached even though the petitioner's mistake about an
extrinsic fact is coupled with the defendant's knowledge of the
mistake and fraudulent nondisclosure, so long as the fraud does
not result in the instrument's failing to state accurately the con-
tract intended and made. 4 Williston states the rule as follows:
If, because of mistake as to an antecedent or existing situation, the
parties make a written instrument which they might not have made,
except for the mistake, the court cannot reform the writing into one
which it thinks they would have made, but in fact never agreed to
make.15
In voluntary transactions, the donor may have the instrument
reformed so as to convey the lesser amount he may have intended.
However, if a conveyance conveys less than the donor intended, a
donee (who is a mere volunteer) may not have the deed reformed
against the donor. 6
The right which a petitioner might otherwise have to reforma-
tion is subject to the limitation that it is never conferred against
"Patterson, Equitable Relief for Unilateral Mistake, 28 Col. L. Rev. 859, 898
(1928).
12 Russell v. Shell Petroleum Corporation, 66 F. 2d 864 (10th Cir. 1933) ; Cleghorn
v. Zumwalt, 83 Cal. 155, 23 Pac. 294 (1890) ; Hitchins v. Pettinghill, 58 N. H. 3 (1876).
13 Isaacs v. Schmuck, 245 N. Y. 77, 156 N. E. 621, 51 A. L. R. 1454 (1927) ; Curtis
v. Albee, 167 N. Y. 360, 60 N. E. 660 (1901).
14 Russell v. Shell, cited supra note 12.
15 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1937) § 1549.
16 Andrews v. Andrews, 12 Ind. 348 (1849).
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a subsequent bona fide purchaser for value and without notice.1"
Consistent with this rule appears to be the case of Rea v. Wilson,'1
in which a mortgagee, who had received the mortgage to secure
a past debt, was permitted reformation of the mortgage and was
held to be prior to other creditors of the mortgagor who had estab-
lished attachment liens subsequent to delivery of the unrecorded
defective mortgage and without notice. The pre-existing debt was
sufficient to give the mortgagee an equitable mortgage, including
the right to reform the written instrument to conform with the
parties' intention, and this was superior to the intervening rights
of creditors who paid no "fresh money" for their liens and were
not, therefore, bona fide purchasers for value. The same result
appears likely in Texas, despite the provisions of a statute, 9 be-
cause judgment creditors' liens are inferior to equitable titles or
rights to which the registration laws do not apply, even though
the creditor has no notice of them at the time when his lien
attaches.2" The right to reform, being a constructive trust, would
not be recordable.
Laches and the statute of limitation are frequently important
defenses in suits for reformation. Clark summarizes the general
rules as follows:
If the plaintiff has all the time been in undisturbed possession of
the tract which was mistakenly omitted from the conveyance, no length
of delay will bar him. In cases where the statute of limitations is applied
by way of analogy, the statutory period is usually considered as begin-
ning when the plaintiff found out the mistake or could have discovered
it by the exercise of ordinary care. In applying the equitable doctrine
of laches the courts ... will take into consideration the entire facts of
the case in determining whether, on the whole, the delay of the plaintiff
17 Op. cit. supra note 3, at 387.
Is 112 Iowa 517, 84 N. W. 539 (1900).
IL TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 6627: "... [M]ortgages shall be void
as to all creditors and subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration without
notice, unless... recorded. .. ."
20 36 Tax. JUR., Records and Registration Acts, § 102, p. 590, citing many cases.
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has been such as to render the giving of reformation inequitable to
the defendant.21
A review of Texas cases indicates the importance of the peti.
tioner's burden in matters of evidence. On the party seeking
reformation rests the burden of proving the alleged mistake, and
that it was mutual between the original parties to the instrument;
also of proving the true terms of the agreement and the facts
which entitle the pleader to reformation. 21 Parol evidence is admis-
sible as to the terms of the real agreement.2 3 But, there must be a
finding upon evidence that is "clear, exact, and satisfactory" that
the mistake of fact was mutual. Also, the party seeking reforma-
tion must prove by such evidence not only "what the true agree-
ment was," but "must go further and establish the fact that the
terms or provisions of the writing which differ from the true
agreement made were placed in the instrument by mutual mis-
take."' 24 But while the evidence must be clear, exact, and satis-
factory, the court must determine, as a matter of law, whether this
test is met and the jury is not to be instructed in such terms.25 This
review of cases discloses that the rules are the same when the
petitioner seeks reformation for unilateral mistake mixed with
fraud of the opposite party.
In the great majority of Texas reformation cases reported in
the last five years, the petitioners sought to reform deeds. The
general rules previously discussed were recognized and applied.
Relief in several cases depended solely on whether the fact-finders
(usually the judge) believed the petitioners had proved that
21 op. cit. supra note 1, § 355.
22 Ascher v. Bird, 209 S. W. 2d 637 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) er. ref.
23 Olvey v. Jones, 137 Tex. 639, 156 S. W. 2d 977 (1941), afJ'g 134 S. W. 2d 845
(Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
24 Pegues v. Dilworth, 134 Tex. 169, 132 S. W. 2d 582 (1939), aff'g 104 S. W. 2d 558
(Tex. Civ. App. 1937) ; Lander Lumber Co. v. Williams, 250 S. W. 2d 317 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1952) er. ref.
25 Reliance Ins. Co. v. Pruitt, 94 S. W. 2d 833 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) er. dism.
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mutual mistake caused the alleged misdescriptions or omissions
in the deeds.26
The defense of laches and statute of limitations has occurred
frequently in other recent cases involving reformation of deeds.
In two cases the courts have applied the rule that the statute of
limitations does not begin to run against a suit to reform a deed
for mutual mistake until the mistake has been discovered or should
have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence; fur-
thermore, the four-year statute of limitations27 is said to apply."
In Cox v. Clay29 these rules were applied where the petitioner had
quitclaimed, to his brother, his undivided interest in a certain de-
scribed tract of land, each believing that the petitioner had only
a 1/20th interest. Previously, unknown to both the petitioner and
his brother, their mother gave her one-half interest, by recorded
deed, to the petitioner. After continuous absence from the state
for nearly twenty years following the conveyance to his brother,
the petitioner returned, discovered the prior deed, and sued to
reform. Concerning the defense of statute of limitations, the court
said that if petitioner was in complete ignorance of the deed from
his mother prior to the time of his alleged discovery, then he had
not failed in the exercise of reasonable diligence to discover the
mistake in his own deed. He was not bound to search for such
a deed as his mother's and was not given constructive notice of
it. Not being a conscious purchaser of the land, he did not come
under the class of persons required to search the records or to
whom such records constitute constructive notice.
The defense of statute of limitations was successfully overcome
by the plaintiff in Hutchins v. Birdsong." There the plaintiff,
26 Hardin v. State, 254 S. W. 2d 898 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) ; Lander Lumber Co. v.
Williams, cited supra note 24; Gaither v. Gaither, 234 S. W. 2d 135 (Tex. Civ. App.
1950) er. rel. n.r.e.; Enos v. Leediker, 214 S. W. 2d 694 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) ; Sunder.
man v. Roberts, 213 S. W. 2d 705 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
27 TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 5529.
28 Clopton v. Cecil, 234 S. W. 2d 251 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) er. ref. n.r.e.; Gaither v,
Gaither, cited supra note 26..
29 237 S. W. 2d 798 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) er. ref. n.r.e.
30 258 S. W. 2d' 218 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
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Birdsong, advanced the purchase price of a tract of land to Ward,
the defendant's husband, taking vendor's lien notes thereon. Later
Birdsong bought a one-half mineral interest in the same tract
from Ward. Still later, one Belitsky, acting as agent for Ward,
arranged to repay the notes and obtained Birdsong's agreement to
execute a warranty deed, as technical grantor, to release the lien.
When he was first consulted by Belitsky, and at the time the deed
was presented to him by Belitsky for signing, Birdsong clearly
indicated that he did not want the deed to affect his one-half min-
eral interest. Assured by both Belitsky and Ward that the mineral
interest would not be affected, and not having his reading glasses
at the time, Birdsong signed the deed. Immediately, Belitsky
executed and delivered an identical warranty deed to Ward, who
recorded. Neither deed reserved the mineral interest. Birdsong
gave it no further thought until twelve years later when the drill-
ing of a nearby oil well caused him to inquire of an abstractor,
only to learn that his mineral interest had been conveyed in the
deeds to Belitsky and Ward. Immediately Birdsong sued for
reformation for mutual mistake, naming Ward's widow, Mrs.
Hutchins, as defendant. The defendant cited Kennedy v. Brown"'
and Kahanek v. Kahanek"2 for the rule that, as a matter of law,
if the grantor is the party seeking reformation, he is charged with
knowledge of the contents of his deed from the date of its execu-
tion, and limitation begins to run against his action to reform it
from that date. The court distinguished those two cases in that
the grantor in each case had either prepared the deed himself
or the deed was prepared at his behest, whereas Birdsong was
induced to sign a deed prepared by the grantee. Considering this,
and the other circumstances, the court held that the evidence was
sufficient to excuse Birdsong from the duty to investigate sooner.
An interesting fact situation, involving a deed, was presented
31113 S. W. 2d 1018 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) er. dism.
32 192 S. W. 2d 174 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
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in Chanoux v. Mesa Corporation." In building on two of its adjoin-
ing lots, Mesa's contractor inadvertently placed, on a triangular
strip of lot 12, the garage and driveway belonging to lot 13. Lot
12 had been platted as a "pie-shaped" lot (with the front end of
the pie cut off). The triangular strip, on which the lot 13 encroach-
ment was built, did not affect the front footage (of fifty-five feet)
but reduced the rear footage from eighty-one to fifty-five feet. A
rock wall was built between the houses in the subdivision such that
the triangular strip of lot 12 was enclosed with lot 13. A map
from a subsequent erroneous survey, on file with the deed records,
failed to show such encroachments. It was at this time that Mrs.
Chanoux was shown the lot 12 house by the an agent who referred
to the erroneous survey and said lot 12 had an average width of
64 feet. Mrs. Chanoux relayed this data to her husband in Chi-
cago, with the earnest money contract prepared for his signature.
The contract described only "Lot 12 of Block 5...." The contract
was signed, the Chanouxs moved into the house, and the deed
was later executed and delivered, bearing the description, "Lot
12 of Block 5... according to the map of Block 5 on file in front
of Book 573, Deed Records .. .. "
Discovering the discrepancy, Mesa brought suit to reform the
deed to exclude that portion of lot 12 walled in with lot 13. In
a trial without a jury, the district court entered judgment reform-
ing the Mesa-Chanoux deed because of mutual mistake in includ-
ing a description in the deed of all of lot 12, "Plaintiff not intend-
ing to convey (the lands lying outside the boundary wall) and
Defendants Chanoux not intending to acquire them.. . ." The court
of civil appeals reversed and rendered judgment for the Chanouxs,
partly on the ground that the lower court's finding of mutual
mistake (in the insertion of the deed description) was not sup-
ported by the evidence. More significant, however, was the court's
opinion that Mesa Corporation could not recover if the case were
remanded. This opinion was based on the holding that, as Mr.
3" 241 S. W. 2d 741 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) er. ref. n.r.e.
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Chanoux had never seen the property at the time he signed the
contract, he could not have believed that he was buying less than
all of lot 12 and that, in this absence of mutual mistake, Mesa
had the legal duty to carry out its contract by executing a deed the
terms of which were the same as the contract. The court appeared
to say: it does not matter that Mrs. Chanoux and the agent of
Mesa were contemplating sale of the lot as bounded by the two
rock walls. The important point is that Mr. Chanoux had only the
knowledge that he was contracting for the purchase of lot 12, of
an average width of sixty-four feet. Nor does it matter that Mr.
Chanoux later saw the lot, before the deed was executed, and
might then have had the undisclosed intent that his purchase con-
sist only of what was bounded by the two rock walls. The court
said, "A mere unexecuted intention to waive rights under the con-
tract on the part of said appellant (Chanoux) would not entitle
appellee to reformation of this instrument and recovery of the
land theretofore conveyed to appellant." Thus, the startling result
is had that the Chanouxs have an extra driveway and an extra
garage, separated from their house by a rock wall! On principle,
the decision appears to be correct and consistent with the leading
California case of Cleghorn v. Zumwalt, 4 cited by the court, al-
though the result seems unreasonable.
A few reported Texas cases of the last five years involve
reformation of instruments other than deeds. An insurance con-
tract suit emphasized the importance of pleading and proving
sufficiently that the alleged error in the contract occurred as a
result of mutual mistake of the parties or that there was fraud
mixed with the plaintiff's unilateral mistake. In a suit to reform
a contract for sale of realty, the court held: when the parties to
a written contract understand that part of their previous agreement
has been omitted from the writing and rely on an oral agreement
s4 Cited supra note 5.




to vary or add to the written agreement in certain respects, equity
cannot reform the writing by inserting the oral agreement.86
The case of Mason v. University of the South87 presents an inter-
esting situation. In 1930 an executor conveyed a parcel of land
in trust to a bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church and his
successors in office, as required by a will which directed that the
estate be given to various charitable purposes. The bishop and
the executor immediately executed a written trust declaration
providing, in part, that upon sale of the land, The University of
the South would receive $250,000 if 70 per cent of the proceeds
amounted to $700,000 or more, the balance to be paid to various
other beneficiaries. The University received a copy of the trust
declaration with the verbal information that it had priority as
to $250,000. In 1946 the University brought suit to reform the
declaration of trust on the ground of mutual mistake, alleging
that it was the intention of the executor and the bishop that the
University should have priority under the trust instrument, receiv-
ing $250,000 out of 70 per cent of the proceeds of sale before
distribution to other beneficiaries. The successor bishop and other
beneficiaries defended the suit and denied mutual mistake. Judg-
ment was entered for the plaintiff in a non-jury trial wherein both
the parties to the trust declaration testified that they intended the
priority claimed by the plaintiff. The defendants vigorously con-
tended that the four-year statute of limitations barred the suit.
The court of civil appeals affirmed the judgment, holding the evi-
dence sufficient to support a finding that neither the executor,
bishop, nor University were non-diligent in not having discovered
the mistake sooner.
While the applications of rules concerning mistake and the
statute of limitations in the Mason case are not unique, it seems
unusual that reformation should be granted to a donee where
the effect is to give the donee more than the term of the instru-
36 Taylor et ux. v. Gill, 211 S. W. 2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
3'212 S. W. 2d 854 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) er. ref. n.r.e.
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ment provided. The court does not discuss this aspect of the case,
leaving open to implication that the rule is different when a donee
is seeking reformation, not against the donor or one of his per-
sonal representatives but against another donee.
Conclusions warranted are: (1) Texas courts apply the general
rules in effect in most jurisdictions; (2) most of the recent re-
ported cases involve deeds; and (3) there is a discernible tendency
of the fact-finders to give the benefit of doubt to seemingly negli-
gent petitioners against the operation of the statute of limitations.
Joseph T. Nance.
